The end of full scale U.S. military operations in Afghanistan may be scheduled for 2014, but it looms as a potent issue in this American election year.
Plenty of commentators have plenty of theories about what will happen when the Afghans have to fend for themselves. However, recent Kandahar radio news reports and listener calls have focused on two potential scenarios involving Taliban intentions.
One scenario would have the insurgency wind down military operations but hold the public’s (read media’s) attention with terrorist attacks while reviving and replenishing in Pakistan until the Americans leave. Then the Taliban would launch a Pakistan-based blitz against Afghan security forces. The key to the outcome would be how well the Afghans are armed and trained to resist the resurgent Taliban threat. Another intangible would be the extent to which Americans would support Afghan security forces with air cover, drones, intelligence and special forces as “trainers.”
Another popular scenario holds that when the Americans go, the chief reason for fighting will leave with them. This is based on a suspicion that many insurgents are motivated by a deep resentment of foreign troops in their homeland or by a quest for revenge after suffering a grievous loss caused by foreign forces. So with no coalition forces to confront, many insurgents might lose their will to fight, drop their weapons and go home. The Taliban would presumably still be a nuisance, but a localized and manageable one.
The wild card in the game is, as always, the public mood when the pullout starts in earnest. If Afghans sense that their army, and particularly their police force, can protect them from intimidation, the Taliban will lose one of its most effective weapons – fear. If economic stability is emerging, that will further reduce the Taliban’s sway over ordinary citizens.
On the other hand, if Afghan security forces cannot assure protection at the local level, the Taliban’s ranks could swell with paid recruits fed up with the status quo or desperate to feed themselves and their families. Meanwhile, Afghans would have to tolerate the insurgents among them in sulking silence, left defenseless by an Afghan security apparatus that is too incompetent or corrupt to counter the assassinations, night letters and other Taliban intimidation tactics.
There are other scenarios that, like these two, are little more than guesses. If peace talks actually produce results, that would of course change everything. There is hope but little optimism that the current contacts will blossom into a durable peace.
The coalition has two years to get things right. The Afghan army is showing signs of competence. The key will be the local police. They are responsible for community law enforcement and protection of the citizenry. At the moment, they are the weak link in the Afghan security chain.
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